Automatically ‘Verifying’ Discrete-Time Complex Systems through Learning, Abstraction and Refinement by Wang, Jingyi et al.
1Automatically ‘Verifying’ Discrete-Time Complex
Systems through Learning, Abstraction and
Refinement
Jingyi Wang, Jun Sun, Shengchao Qin, and Cyrille Jegourel
Abstract—Precisely modeling complex systems like cyber-physical systems is challenging, which often render model-based system
verification techniques like model checking infeasible. To overcome this challenge, we propose a method called LAR to automatically
‘verify’ such complex systems through a combination of learning, abstraction and refinement from a set of system log traces. We
assume that log traces and sampling frequency are adequate to capture ‘enough’ behaviour of the system. Given a safety property and
the concrete system log traces as input, LAR automatically learns and refines system models, and produces two kinds of outputs. One
is a counterexample with a bounded probability of being spurious. The other is a probabilistic model based on which the given property
is ‘verified’. The model can be viewed as a proof obligation, i.e., the property is verified if the model is correct. It can also be used for
subsequent system analysis activities like runtime monitoring or model-based testing. Our method has been implemented as a
self-contained software toolkit. The evaluation on multiple benchmark systems as well as a real-world water treatment system shows
promising results.
Index Terms—Verification, model learning, abstraction refinement, Cyber-physical system
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1 INTRODUCTION
CYBER-PHYSICAL systems (CPS) integrate physical and engi-neered systems and have the potential to transform the way
people interact with engineered systems. They are often used to
control public infrastructures like water purification/distribution
systems or smart grid systems. When CPS are employed in
such safety-critical scenarios, it is desirable to show that they
can operate dependably and safely. Analyzing CPS, however, is
challenging. Existing system analysis methods, like model-based
testing, model checking and theorem proving, require the avail-
ability of a system model. Because CPS closely interact with the
physical environment, the model must not only capture the system
behavior but also the environment’s. Modeling the environment
is often hard, due to complicated continuous dynamics in the
physical environment.
CPS are merely an example of those complex systems for
which manual modeling is challenging. To tackle the chal-
lenge, multiple approaches that do not rely on manual modeling
have been explored. One example is statistical model checking
(SMC) [58]. The idea is to provide a statistical measure on the
likelihood of satisfying a given property, by observing sample
system traces and applying techniques like hypothesis testing [28],
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[58]. However, SMC has its limitations. For instance, since SMC
relies on sampling finite system traces, it is challenging to verify
un-bounded properties [46], [56], like eventually always some-
thing good happens. Furthermore, when SMC claims a property is
verified, it provides no insight on why the property holds. If a new
property is given, SMC must be applied from scratch. Another
approach for avoiding manual modeling is to automatically learn
models from system logs (i.e., sample system traces). Multiple
learning algorithms have been proposed to learn a variety of
models, e.g., [13], [21], [48], [49]. It has been shown that such
learned models can be useful for system analysis in certain
scenarios. Recently, the idea has been extended to learn models
for system verification through model checking. In [16], [40],
[41], [42], the authors proposed to learn probabilistic models and
then apply techniques like probabilistic model checking (PMC)
to calculate the probability of satisfying a property based on the
learned model. Compared to SMC, learning could be beneficial as
it overcomes several known limitations with SMC. For instance,
we can verify unbounded properties based on the learned model.
Furthermore, the learned model could be useful for a range of
system analysis or control objectives, e.g., for model-based testing
and for implementing runtime monitors.
Existing learning methods [13], [16], [21], [40], [41], [48],
[49] however have multiple issues. Firstly, they are designed with
a fixed level of abstraction, which limits their applicability to real-
world systems. For instance, the traces we obtain from a real-
world water treatment system [3] capture the reading of 25 sensors
plus 26 variables used in the control software. Furthermore, these
variables are mostly float or double. Without abstraction, it is
hard to learn a precise and reasonably small model of the system.
Determining the right level of abstraction is however highly non-
trivial. As far as we know, it has not been investigated on how
to learn probabilistic models at the right level of abstraction.
Secondly, existing learning methods do not take into account the
2property to be verified. In a recent empirical study [55], it is
observed that the verification results based on the learned models
could deviate significantly from the actual results.
In this work, we aim to develop a method to ‘verify’ CPS
by learning models at a level of abstraction which is ideal for
verifying or falsifying the given property, and by generating
verification results which are validated against the actual sys-
tem. The method we propose is called LAR, which is a novel
combination of probabilistic model learning and counterexample
guided abstraction refinement (CEGAR) [17], [18], [31]. Combing
learning and CEGAR is far from straightforward, due to the lack
of a “ground-truth” model.
The overall workflow is shown in Fig. 1. The input of LAR
includes a probabilistic property and a set of system traces, which
could be obtained from a logger in the system. We assume
that the logging mechanism (i.e., the logged variables and the
logging frequency) are adequate to capture ‘enough’ behaviour
of the system regarding the property. We first construct a set of
abstract system traces through predicate abstraction. Next, we
apply existing automatic model learning techniques to construct
a probabilistic model of the system, in the form of a discrete
time Markov chain (DTMC). Afterwards, we apply PMC to verify
the model against the property. If a counterexample is identified,
we check whether the counterexample, in the form of a set of
paths of the learned model, is spurious. Notice that because we
do not have a model of the system, we cannot completely verify
whether the counterexample is spurious or not. We solve the
problem by applying hypothesis testing to bound the probability
of the counterexample being spurious. If the counterexample is not
spurious, we report that the system fails the property. Otherwise,
we analyze the counterexample to generate a new predicate which
would rule out the counterexample.
Due to the lack of a system model, standard methods for gener-
ating new predicates (e.g., weakest pre-condition calculation [18]
or interpolation [29]) are infeasible. We solve the problem by
adopting classification techniques from the machine learning
community (refer to Section 3.4 for details). We then repeat the
process until either we have identified a counterexample or have
constructed a probabilistic model of the system based on which
the property is verified. In the latter case, the model generated
by our method could be viewed as a proof obligation (i.e., the
property is verified if the model is correct), which could be
further evaluated by experts or through other means (like statistical
validation of the model). Furthermore, our learned models can be
potentially used for many subsequent system analysis activities.
For instance, we could use the models for model checking [38]
and implementing runtime monitors [51]. The models can also
help design more robust systems [33]. We could also use them
for model-based testing to generate more useful test cases [44].
Lastly, our method has the potential to help people understand
how a complex system works by automatically extracting relevant
predicates. We implemented our method as a software toolkit and
applied it to benchmark systems and a real-world water treatment
system. The evaluation validated our approach well.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2
reviews necessary background and defines our problem. Section 3
presents the details of our approach. Section 4 presents our im-
plementation and evaluates our method. Section 5 reviews related
work and Section 6 concludes.
2 BACKGROUND
System Assumptions. We assume that the system under anal-
ysis, denoted as M , has n observable variables, i.e., VM =
{V1, V2, · · · , Vn}. Each variable Vi is associated with a domain
Di which may have infinite values. For instance, the variables in
a water treatment system include those variables in the control
software (with finite domains) as well as those representing the
environment (with infinite domains). We assume that M is a
complicated system such that we do not know exactly how the
variables VM change. However, we assume that M is determin-
istic if VM is fully observed, i.e., the same sequence valuations
of VM lead to the same system behaviors. The state of M can be
observed through implementing a logger in the system which (e.g.,
periodically) outputs the valuation of VM . Thus, we can obtain a
set of finite traces of the system. In the following, we assume that
the logged variables and the sampling frequency are adequate to
capture the relevant behavior of the system.
We write ⌃(VM ) (hereafter ⌃ for short) to denoteD1⇥ · · ·⇥
Dn, which is the set of all observable states of M . Note that ⌃
may be infinite if there are float variables with infinite domains.
A finite system trace is a sequence ⇡ = hs1, s2, · · · , sni where
si 2 ⌃ for all i. In other words, a finite system trace can be seen
as a finite string over ⌃. We denote the set of all finite strings
over ⌃, including the empty string hi, as ⌃?. Given a string t, we
say that a string t0 is a prefix of t if and only if there is a string
t00 2 ⌃? such that t = t0 · t00 where · denotes string concatenation.
We write prefix (t) to denote the set of all prefixes of t. We denote
a system trace with length l by ⇡l and its k-th letter by ⇡[k]. We
also use ⇡[i · · · j] to denote the trace from ⇡[i] to ⇡[j].
System model. Let ⌃0 be the set of initial states of system M .
If we impose a prior probability distribution µ0 on the states in
⌃0 (e.g., a uniform distribution over all states in ⌃0), M can be
effectively viewed as a discrete time Markov Chain (DTMC) [11].
Formally,
Definition 1. A DTMC D is a tuple (S, ıinit, P r), where S is
a countable, nonempty set of states ; ıinit : S ! [0, 1]
is the initial distribution s.t.
P
s2S ıinit(s) = 1; and Pr :
S ⇥ S ! [0, 1] is the transition probability assigned to
every pair of states which satisfies the following condition:P
s02S Pr(s, s
0) = 1.
An example DTMC is shown in Fig. 2, where states are labeled
for readability. A DTMC induces an underlying digraph where
states act as vertices and there is an edge from s to s0 if and only
if Pr(s, s0) > 0. Given a path ⇡ = hs1, s2, · · · , sni in D, we
write P(⇡,D) = Pr(s1, s2)⇥Pr(s2, s3)⇥ · · ·⇥Pr(sn 1, sn)
to denote the probability of exhibiting ⇡ in D. Furthermore, we
write Pathfin(D) to denote the set of finite paths of D starting
with an initial state, i.e., a state s such that ıinit(s) > 0.
M can be viewed as a DTMC DM = (S, ıinit, P r) where
S = ⌃ is the states of M ; ıinit = µ0 is the imposed prior
probability distribution of the initial states.
Model learning. Once we obtain a set of system traces from the
system logger, we can then apply a probabilistic model learning
algorithm to ‘learn’ a DTMC. Most existing model learning
algorithms are inspired by ALERGIA [13], which first transforms
the traces into a prefix tree and then iteratively merges the tree
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nodes based on whether the two nodes are compatible. Based on
the same idea, a genetic-algorithm based learning algorithm is
proposed in [55] to merge the tree nodes through evolution. We
present one of the latest ALERGIA-style learning algorithms as a
representative [40], [42] in Section 3.2. With the learned DTMC,
we can verify safety properties by probabilistic model checking.
Probabilistic model checking. Assume that we are given a prop-
erty in the form of a probabilistic linear temporal logic formula
(PLTL) [10], [27]. The syntax of the PLTL is defined as follows.
' ::= p|¬'|' ^ '|P./r('U')
where p is an atomic proposition constituted by V , r 2 [0, 1] ✓
R, ./2 {<,, >, } and U is a modal operator which reads
‘until’. The properties of interest in this work is the safety
fragment of PLTL properties. In the following, we focus on the
property of the form1: Pr(F') where F' is a short form for
trueU'. Intuitively, this property states that the probability of
eventually reaching a bad state does not exceed a certain threshold.
For instance, property P0.2(F observe0 > 1) states that the
property of reaching a state with observe0 > 1 is less than 0.2.
A DTMC D satisfies Pr(F') if and only if the accumulated
probability of all paths in Pathfin(D) which satisfy F' is less
than or equal to r. We write D ✏ Pr(F') to denote that DTMC
D satisfies Pr(F').
The reason that we focus on probabilistic properties is that
safety-critical CPS are often designed with built-in mechanisms
for handling safety violation (e.g., a shutdown sequence is
1. Recursive PLTL properties are not handled due to the limit of model
learning [42].
triggered once a violation is detected). The goal of analysis is thus
to show such safety violation is rare (i.e., with low probability).
For instance, in our case study of the water treatment system,
a safety property is that the water level in the backwash tank
must be within certain range. Otherwise, a system shutdown
is triggered. Our task is then to show the probability of the
water level being out of the range is low enough such that the
probability of triggering system shutdown is low.
Problem Definition. Our problem is then defined as follows.
Given a system M and a property Pr(F'), how do we check
whether the property is satisfied by M without having its model
D? In case that the property is not satisfied, can we present some
evidence , i.e., in the form of counterexamples? In case that the
property is satisfied, can we present some evidence as well?
3 OUR APPROACH
Since the system is complicated and a precise system model is
unavailable, we cannot apply existing techniques like PMC to
check whether the property is satisfied or not. One way to solve
the problem is to construct a DTMC model D approximating M
and then verify the given property based on D. There are however
a number of questions that must be answered in order to make
this approach work. First, how do we construct D systematically?
In particular, what are the states in D and what are the transition
probabilities? If we consider every different valuation of variables
VM to be a different state, D is likely to contain many (and
often infinitely many) states. Such D is difficult to learn or
verify. We thus would like to construct a small D (with states
more abstract than a valuation of VM ) which would be used to
verify the property. Secondly, after constructing D and verifying
the property based on D, how do we quantify the confidence
we have on the verification result, knowing that D may not be
precise? In the following, we present answers of these questions.
For simplicity, we illustrate how our approach works using the
following running example (which is motivated by the crowds
protocol [45]).
Example Assume a system where multiple users are browsing
the web (i.e., sending/receiving messages to/from Web servers).
Further assume there are eavesdroppers on the network who
can observe the direct source of a message. In order to provide
4TABLE 1: Details of the variables in the crowds protocols.
Name Type Meaning
launch bool Start modeling?
new bool Initialize a new protocol instance?
runCount int Counts protocol instances
start bool Start the protocol?
run bool Run the protocol?
lastSeen int Last crowd member to touch msg
good bool Crowd member is good?
bad bool Crowd member is bad?
recordLast bool Record last seen crowd member?
badObserve bool Bad members observes who sent msg?
deliver bool Deliver message to destination?
done bool Protocol instance finished?
observe0 to observe19 int Counters for attackers’ observations
anonymity for the users, a message from a user is not directly sent
to the destination, but rather routed among the users so that the
eavesdroppers cannot identify the actual source of the message.
Each user in the system uses a complicated algorithm to decide on
whether to forward a received message to its destination or to some
other user on the network. Assume there are a total of u users.
The property to be verified is that the probability of observing a
message sending to its destination by its actual source more than
once in r runs should not exceed a threshold, say 0.2. Formally,
it is specified as: P 0.2(F observe0 > 1) where observe0 is
a variable in the system which captures the number of message
sending to its destination by its actual source. Without knowing
how each user decides on forwarding the messages, we cannot
develop a precise model.
3.1 Predicate Abstraction
In our approach, we start with collecting a set of system traces ⇧,
by introducing a logger in the system and executing the system
multiple times. For instance, in the running example, we log
the valuation of all 32 variables, including where the message
is originated, where it is forwarded to, etc. The details of all
the logged variables are shown in Table 1. The logged traces
contain many details, most of which may not be relevant to
verifying the property. Thus, we start with abstracting the traces,
through predicate abstraction [54]. Recall that a concrete trace is
a sequence hs0, s1, · · · , sni where si 2 ⌃ for all i is a valuation
of variables VM . Predicate abstraction is to construct an abstract
trace ha0, a1, · · · , ani where, for all i, ai is the valuation of a set
of propositions AP given si.
Let BExprV denote the Boolean expressions over V . A
proposition  is a Boolean expression over a set of variables.
For an expression e 2 ExprV , we denote its valuation in state
s 2 ⌃ by [[e]]s. For a Boolean expression e, [[e]]s 2 {0, 1}
where 0 stands for false and 1 for true. We write s |=  iff
[[ ]]s = 1. We denote the set of states satisfying a predicate  by
[[ ]] = {s|s 2 ⌃ ^ s |=  }.
Let P = {p1, · · · , pk} ✓ BExprV be a set of propositions
over V . Given a state s 2 ⌃, we define an abstraction function
as: ↵P (s) = ([[p1]]s, · · · , [[pk]]s), which maps the state s to an
abstract state, i.e., a bit vector with length k where each bit repre-
sents the truth value of a proposition in P . We write ⌃P to denote
the set of abstract states with respects to P . Given a logged trace
⇡ = hs1, s2, · · · , sni, we can construct an abstract trace with re-
spect to predicates P as: ⇡P = h↵P (s1),↵P (s2), · · · ,↵P (sn)i.
Let ⇧ be the set of sample traces such that each ⇡ 2 ⇧ is a string
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in ⌃⇤. We can construct a set of abstract traces ⇧P from ⇧ by
abstracting each trace in ⇧ one by one.
In our running example, we assume that the set ⇧ contains
two logged traces: h0, 0, 1, 1i and h0, 1, 2, 2i where each number
denotes a value of variable observe0. Note that we have removed
the values of all other 32 variables for simplicity. Based on the
above-mentioned property, we set the initial set of predicates P to
be {observe0 > 1}. After predicate abstraction, we obtain two
corresponding abstract traces: h0, 0, 0, 0i and h0, 0, 1, 1i where a
number 0 means that observe0  1 and 1 means observe0 > 1.
3.2 Model Learning
With the set of abstract traces ⇧P , we then apply existing model
learning techniques [16], [40], [42], [55] to construct a DTMC
model DP . The essential idea of model learning is to construct
a DTMC DP such that it maximizes the probability of observing
the traces ⇧P as well as contains a relatively small number of
states. Several learning algorithms have been proposed [13], [21],
[48], [49], [55]. In the following, we present one of the learning
algorithms called AALERGIA [40], [42] as a representative and
remark that our approach can be configured to work with different
learning algorithms, as we show in Section 4.
AALERGIA learning algorithm The AALERGIA algorithm
makes the following assumptions. First, the sample traces are
generated by a system which can be modeled as a DTMC.
Secondly, the sample traces are mutually independent. Thirdly,
the length of each trace is independent from the sequence of states
observed. The AALERGIA algorithm has been proved to converge
to the actual model if a sufficiently large number of sample traces
are provided [40], [42].
Let prefix (⇧P ) = {prefix (t)|t 2 ⇧P } be the set of all
prefixes of any trace in ⇧P . The set of traces ⇧P can be naturally
organized into a tree tree(⇧P ) = (N, root, E) where each node
in N is a member of prefix (⇧P ); the root is the empty string hi;
and E ✓ N ⇥N is a set of edges such that (⇡,⇡0) is in E if and
only if there exists e 2 ⌃ such that ⇡ · hei = ⇡0. For instance,
assume that ⇧P in our running example contains 100 abstract
traces: 88 of them are h0, 0, 0, 0i, 2 of them are h0, 0, 0, 1i, 2 of
them are h0, 0, 1i, and 8 of them are h0, 0, 1, 1i. Fig. 3 shows
the tree representing this set of abstract traces, where each node
represents a prefix of some abstract trace. The state labels are to
be explained later.
The AALERGIA algorithm is inspired by stochastic regular
grammatical inference, which aims to learn the structure of a
stochastic finite state automaton and estimate its transition prob-
abilities [34]. The idea is to generalize tree(⇧P ) by merging the
tree nodes according to certain criteria in certain fixed order. Intu-
itively, two nodes should be merged if they are likely to represent
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the same state in the underlying DTMC. Since by assumption we
do not know the underlying DTMC, whether two nodes should be
merged is heuristically decided through a compatibility test, which
intuitively measures how similar two nodes are. We remark that the
compatibility test effectively controls the degree of generalization.
Different types of compatibility test have been studied [13], [34],
[47]. In [13], the compatibility test is based on the Hoeffding
bounds, whereas the DSAI algorithm proposed in [21] uses a
condition based on calculating certain distance between the two
nodes. In the following, we present the compatibility test adopted
in AALERGIA.
First, each node ⇡ in tree(⇧P ) is labeled with the number
of traces ⇡0 in ⇧P such that ⇡ is a prefix of ⇡0. Let L(⇡)
denotes its label. Two nodes ⇡1 and ⇡2 in tree(⇧P ) are con-
sidered compatible if and only if they satisfy two conditions.
The first condition is last(⇡1) = last(⇡2) where last(⇡) is
the last letter in a string ⇡, i.e., ⇡1 and ⇡2 must agree on
the last abstract state. The second condition is that the future
behaviors from ⇡1 and ⇡2 must be sufficiently similar (i.e., within
Angluin’s bound [8]). Formally, given a node ⇡ in tree(⇧P ),
we can obtain a probabilistic distribution of the next node by
normalizing the labels of the node and its children. In particular,
for any event e 2 ⌃P , the probability of going from node ⇡ to
⇡ · hei, i.e., the probability of observing e after ⇡, is defined as:
Pr(⇡, hei) = L(⇡·hei)L(⇡) . We remark the probability of going from
node ⇡ to itself, i.e., the probability of not observing the next
node, is Pr(⇡, hi) = 1   Pe2⌃P Pr(⇡, hei). The multi-step
probability from node ⇡ to ⇡ · ⇡0 where ⇡0 = he1, e2, · · · , eki,
written as Pr(⇡,⇡0), is the product of the one-step probabilities.
Pr(⇡,⇡0) = Pr(⇡, he1 i)⇥ Pr(⇡ · he1 i, he2 i)⇥
· · ·⇥ Pr(⇡ · he1 , e2 , · · · , ek 1 i, hek i) (1)
Two nodes ⇡1 and ⇡2 are compatible if the following is satisfied:
for all ⇡ 2 ⌃?P ,
|Pr(⇡1,⇡)  Pr(⇡2 ,⇡)| <
q
6 ✏ log(L(⇡1 ))/L(⇡1 )+q
6✏ log(L(⇡2))/L(⇡2)
(2)
Intuitively, it means that the distribution of future traces from ⇡1
and ⇡2 must be similar. We highlight that ✏ used in Eq. 2 is a
parameter which effectively controls the degree of node merging.
Intuitively, a larger ✏ leads to more node merging and subsequently
fewer states in the learned model DP . It is also required that
✏ should be larger than 1 to guarantee the convergence of the
algorithm.
If ⇡1 and ⇡2 are compatible, the tree is transformed such
that the incoming edge of ⇡2 is directed to ⇡1. Next, for any
⇡ 2 ⌃⇤P , L(⇡1 · ⇡) is incremented by L(⇡2 · ⇡). The algorithm
works by iteratively identifying nodes which are compatible and
merging them until there are no more compatible nodes. The order
of choosing merging candidates is hierarchical: first in order of
tree depth and for a given depth in the alphabet order of the last
observation.
Recall that Fig. 3 is the tree representing 100 abstract traces of
our running example. The labels on the nodes are the numbers of
times the corresponding string is a prefix of some trace in ⇧P . For
instance, node hi is labeled with 100 because hi is a prefix of all
traces. This tree can be viewed as the initial learned model which
has no generalization. Next, the tree is generalized by merging
nodes. Assume that node h00i and node h000i in Fig. 3 pass the
compatibility test so that they are to be merged. Firstly, we update
the node label of h00i to be the sum of the numbers labeling h00i
and h000i. Secondly, the numbers labeling decedents of h000i are
added to the corresponding decedent nodes of h00i. The result is
shown in Fig. 4, where the numbers after the arrow are the ones
after node merging. For instance, since L(h000i · h1i) is 2, we
update the label of node h001i from 10 to 12.
After merging all compatible nodes, the last step is to normal-
ize the tree so that it becomes a DTMC DP . In particular, each
node ⇡ is taken as a state in DP . The transition probability from
⇡ to a child ⇡0 is set to be: L(⇡
0)
L(⇡) and the probability to itself is set
to 1 minus the sum of probabilities to its children accordingly. For
instance, in the example shown in Fig. 4, the probability transiting
from node h00i to node h001i is 12190 , and the probability to itself
is 1  12190 .
Remark 1. Notice that the parameter ✏ in Eq. 2 has an immediate
effect on the compatible test and thus the learned model. One
question would be how to determine the best ✏ for the best
learning outcome. AALERGIA measures how good a learned
modelDP is by the Bayesian Information Criteria (BIC) score.
Intuitively, a learned model which generates the input system
traces ⇧P with higher probability and has fewer number of
states has a higher BIC score. AALERGIA thus automatically
searches for the best ✏ that has the highest BIC score and
output the corresponding model [40].
GA-based learning algorithm A genetic-algorithm based learn-
ing approach (GA in short hereafter) was proposed in [55]. The
idea is to reduce the problem of model learning to an optimization
problem, i.e., finding an optimal DTMC DP that has the highest
BIC score. GA encodes a chromosome by randomly merging the
nodes in the prefix tree and apply mutations and crossover in the
standard way to search for the best model. It has been shown such
an approach could outperform AALERGIA sometimes [55]. We
remark that different model learning approaches can be adopted in
this work.
3.3 Spuriousness Checking
Given the learned DTMC model DP and the property Pr(F'),
we then use an existing probabilistic model checker (e.g.,
PRISM [38]) to check whether DP |= Pr(F'). There are two
cases.
The first case is that DP |= Pr(F') is not satisfied. Since
this verification result is based on the learned model DP , it may
not be correct according to M . Thus, we must validate this result
based on the actual system. To do so, we construct a probabilistic
counterexample and check whether the counterexample is spuri-
ous. In general, a probabilistic counterexample is in the form of
6a tree [26]. Since we assume that our property is in the form of
Pr(F'), we define it to be a set of abstract paths of DP for
simplicity.
Definition 2. Given a DTMC DP and a property Pr(F'),
a counterexample is a set C ✓ Pathfin(DP ) such that
last(⇡) |= ' for every path ⇡ in C , andP⇡2C P(⇡,DP ) >
r.
Intuitively, a probabilistic counterexample for Pr(F') is a set
of finite paths in DP whose accumulated probability is larger than
r. There are existing approaches to construct such counterexam-
ples [26]. In our setting, because DP is learned based on a set of
abstract traces, a probabilistic counterexample may be spurious.
A probabilistic counterexample C is spurious if and only if the
probability measure of the concrete paths of M corresponding to
C is less than r. Given an abstract path ⇡ = ha1, a2, · · · , ani 2
Pathfin(DP ), we write  (⇡) to denote the set of concrete paths
{hs1, s2, · · · , sni 2 Pathfin(M)|8i. ↵P (si) = ai} which
become ⇡ after predicate abstraction using P . We write  (C) to
denote the set of corresponding concrete paths: {⇡0|9⇡ 2 C, ⇡0 2
 (⇡)}.
Definition 3. Given the system M , a DTMC DP , a property
Pr(F') and a counterexample C in terms of DP and
Pr(F'), C is a spurious counterexample of M if and only
if
P
⇡2 (C) P(⇡,M)  r.
Recall that M can be viewed as a DTMC and P(⇡,M) is
the probability of path ⇡ in M . The above notion of spurious
counterexample is a special case of that of probabilistic automaton
defined in [31]. Checking whether a probabilistic counterexample
C is spurious or not in our setting is however more challenging
than that in the setting of [31]. The reason is that we do not have
a model of M and thus the probability of a concrete path in M
cannot be calculated. Our solution is to adopt hypothesis test-
ing [58] to test whether the hypothesis
P
⇡2 (C) P(⇡,M) > r
holds given certain error bounds. If it does, we report the coun-
terexample to the user together with the error bounds. Otherwise,
we conclude that it is a spurious counterexample and proceed to
the next step, i.e., abstraction refinement.
In the following, we briefly introduce how hypothesis testing is
used for spuriousness checking. Hypothesis testing is a statistical
process to decide the truthfulness of two mutual exclusive state-
ments. One is H0: the null hypothesis that the counterexample
is not spurious, i.e.,
P
⇡2 (C) P(⇡,M) > r. The other is H1:
the alternative hypothesis that the counterexample is spurious,
i.e.,
P
⇡2 (C) P(⇡,M)  r. The probability of making an
error is bounded by (↵, ), such that the probability of a Type-
I (respectively, a Type-II) error, which rejects H0 (respectively,
H1) while H0 (respectively, H1) holds, is less or equal to ↵
(respectively,  ). The test needs to be relaxed with a confidence
interval (r    , r +  ), where neither hypothesis is rejected and
the test continues to bound both types of errors [39]. In practice,
the parameters (i.e., (↵, ), and  ) can often be decided by how
much testing resources are available. In general, more resource is
required for a smaller error bound.
Hypothesis testing works by keeping sampling traces from
M until a stopping condition is satisfied. There are two main
methods to decide when sampling can be stopped. One is fixed-
size sampling test, which requires running all the predefined
number of tests. One difficulty of this approach is to find the
appropriate number of tests to be performed such that the error
bounds are valid [39]. In this work, we adopt the alternative
approach, which is sequential probability ratio test (SPRT). SPRT
dynamically decides whether to reject or not a hypothesis every
time we obtain a new trace, which yields a variable sample size.
SPRT is usually faster than fixed-size sampling test as the testing
process ends as soon as a conclusion is made. In the following, we
briefly introduce how SPRT works and readers can refer to [39]
for details.
The basic idea of SPRT is to calculate the probability ratio
each time after observing a trace and evaluate two stopping
conditions [9]. If either of the conditions is satisfied, the testing
stops and returns which hypothesis is rejected. Let n be the
number of sampled traces so far, the decision is based on the
following probability ratio:
p1n
p0n
=
nY
i=1
P (Bi = bi|p = p1)
P (Bi = bi|p = p0) =
pdn1 (1  p1)n dn
pdn0 (1  p0)n dn
(3)
, where p1 = r +  , p0 = r    , Bi is a random variable with
boolean values representing whether a new sampled trace is in the
counterexample (1 if yes and 0 otherwise), dn is the number of
sampled trace which are in the counterexample. We will accept
H0 (reject H1) if p1np0n   1  ↵ and H1 (reject H0) if p1np0n   1 ↵ .
Otherwise, SPRT continues sampling until either H0 or H1 is
rejected. We remark that SPRT is guaranteed to terminate with
probability 1 [9].
In our running example, hypothesis testing is done by repeat-
edly generating messages from some user in the network and
observe the resultant traces. Assume there are now a total of
n traces in ⇧ (including the ones obtained initially) and b of
them are in  (C). We can then calculate whether to accept H0
or H1 based on n and b in the standard way. If neither can be
accepted, we continue sampling and updating n and b until one
of the hypothesis is accepted. The following theorem follows the
correctness of hypothesis testing immediately.
Theorem 1. If LAR reports a counterexample, the probability of
M satisfying the property is ‘bounded’ by  . ⇤
Proof 1. Notice that if the counterexample is not spurious, then the
property is violated by the system. So the probability that M
satisfies the property is no larger than the probability that the
counterexample is actually spurious while a counterexample is
reported, which is the Type-II error bounded by  .
In the case that the model checker confirms that DP |= Pr(F'),
it is guaranteed that the the original system M satisfies the
property if an unbounded number of traces are used for learning.
Theorem 2. If ⇧ has an unbounded number of traces, DP |=
Pr(F') with probability 1 only if M satisfies the property.
⇤
Proof 2. The proof of the theorem is as follows. First, the
AALERGIA algorithm eventually converges to the actual
underlying DTMC [40], [42] with probability 1, which is a
quotient automaton of the original model M (with respect to
the predicate abstraction). Second, it is established in [31] that
the quotient automaton simulates the original systemM . Thus,
it is safe to conclude thatM satisfies the property if its quotient
automaton does.
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However, the number of traces in ⇧ is often limited in practice
and there is no guarantee that the learned modelDP has converged
to a model which simulates M . Our remedy to this problem is
that we present the model DP as a part of the verification result.
That is, we report that the property is satisfied by the system,
provided that DP is a correct model of the system. We remark
that because there is no precise system model, our goal is not
to completely verify the system. Rather, our goal is to provide
evidence (a counterexample or a model) with confidence on why
we believe that the verification result is sound. If we would like to
have certain confidence on the “correctness” of the learned model
DP , one way is to make sure that the number of traces in ⇧
satisfies certain constraints. We skip the details as this is beyond
the scope of this work. A discussion on the number of samples
required to guarantee that the difference between the transition
probabilities of DP and M is given in Appendix A.
3.4 Refinement
If the counterexample C is spurious after hypothesis testing, the
abstract model DP is to be refined so as to rule out the spurious
counterexample. Following the idea of CEGAR [18], [31], this is
achieved by identifying a new predicate for predicate abstraction.
Due to the lack of a system model, standard methods for generat-
ing new predicates (e.g., weakest pre-condition calculation [18] or
interpolation [29]) are infeasible in our setting. We thus adopt
techniques from the machine learning community to solve the
problem.
Identify spurious transitions The first step of identifying a new
predicate is to identify spurious transitions in the counterexample.
Fundamentally, spuriousness is the result of an inappropriate level
of abstraction. Fig. 5 shows how abstraction could induce more
probability measure over abstract paths, due to broken paths [35].
The probability of paths in the counterexample C may be inflated.
Intuitively, if a probabilistic counterexample C is spurious, there
must be at least one path ⇡ in C whose probability is inflated,
i.e., ⇡ has certain probability d in DP , whereas the accumulated
probability of  (⇡) in M is less than d. Furthermore, there must
be at least one transition in ⇡ whose probability in DP is higher
than the accumulated probability of the corresponding concrete
transitions in M . The idea is then: if we are able to identify such
an abstract path ⇡ and such a transition in ⇡, we could refine DP
such that the transition is no longer associated with the inflated
probability so that C may no longer be a counterexample. In the
following, we define such transitions and later use them to find
new predicates.
Formally, let C = {⇡1,⇡2, · · · ,⇡n} be a spurious proba-
bilistic counterexample. Let hs, s0i be a pair of consecutive states
which form a transition of a path ⇡i in C . Let  (s) denote the
set of concrete states in M which become s after abstraction,
i.e.,  (s) = {x 2 ⌃|[[x]]P = s}, and | (s)| denote the
number of concrete states in  (s). We write P(hs, s0i,M) to
be
P
s02 (s),s002 (s0)#(hs0, s00i,M)/| (s)|, i.e., the probability
of having a corresponding concrete transition in M . hs, s0i is
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Fig. 6: Identify a most spurious transition
called a spurious transition if P(hs, s0i,DP ) > P(hs, s0i,M).
Since we do not have the model M , it is impossible to compute
P(hs, s0i,M). Rather, we estimate it based on ⇧ (which now
contains all traces sampled during the hypothesis testing in the
previous step). That is, given the set of sample traces ⇧, we esti-
mate P(hs, s0i,M) by #hs, s0i/#s where #hs, s0i is the number
of times the transitions take place and#s is the number of times s
is visited. Next, we identify the most spurious transition for refine-
ment, i.e., the transition hs, s0i s.t. P(hs, s0i,DP )  #hs, s0i/#s
is the largest of all transitions.
Algorithm 1 gives a detailed description on how we identify
the most spurious transitions. We first collect all the transitions in
the learned model DP at line 1. Then we iterate through all the
transitions at line 4. For each transition, we apply Algorithm 2 to
obtain #s and #hs, s0i. The basic idea is to check all the traces
in ⇧ and count how many times we observe an abstract state s
and a transition hs, s0i. We then calculate the difference between
P(hs, s0i,DP ) #hs, s0i/#s at line 7. After iterating through all
the transitions, we sort them in descending order according to the
difference at line 11 and return the sorted transitions at line 12.
Fig. 6 shows the first learned model DP of our running
example on the top-left, where there are two states 0 and 1 repre-
senting the state observe0  1 and observe0 > 1 respectively.
There are in total three transitions: h0, 0i , h0, 1i, h1, 1i. Based
on the learned model, P(h0, 0i,DP ) is 0.998; P(h0, 1i,DP )
is 0.002 and P(h1, 1i,DP ) is 1. Assume that the estimation
of P(h0, 0i,M) is 0.997; the estimation of P(h0, 1i,M) is
0.003; and the estimation of P(h1, 1i,M) is 1. By calculating
the difference between the transition in the learned model and
its estimation, we find that the transition h0, 0i has the largest
difference (i.e., the most spurious), which is used for abstraction
refinement.
Remark 2. We remark that the identified spurious transitions may
be different if two different counterexamples are provided.
Note that we follow the approach in [26], which calculates
a smallest counterexample, i.e., a minimum set of paths to
form a counterexample.
Labeled data collection Next, we identify a new predicate based
on the most spurious transition hs, s0i. Intuitively, the reason that
the transition is spurious is that many abstract paths in DP going
through this transition are infeasible. This is illustrated in Fig. 5,
where a number of paths are ‘broken’ at the middle state. Note
that each abstract state in DP groups a set of concrete states in ⌃.
Intuitively, hs, s0i is spurious because s groups some states which
cannot transit to any concrete states in s0, with states which can.
As a result, the probability of transiting from s to s0 is inflated.
Thus, in order to prune the spurious counterexample, we need to
refine the model such that s is split in a way such that the states
which cannot transit to any concrete states in s0 are separated from
8Algorithm 1: IdentifyST(⇧,DP , P )
1 Collect all the transitions Trans in DP ;
2 Let PDiffs be the array storing the probability differences;
3 Let ATrans be the set of analyzed transitions and
initialized to be empty;
4 while Trans! = ; do
5 Randomly pick a transition Tran = hs, s0i from Trans;
6 Apply Algorithm 2 CountTran(Tran,⇧, P ) to get #s
and #hs, s0i ;
7 Calculate Pdiff as the difference between #hs, s0i/#s
and the transition probability of hs, s0i in DP ;
8 Add Pdiff to PDiffs;
9 Add Tran to ATrans;
10 Remove Tran from Trans;
11 Sort ATrans according to PDiffs in descending order;
12 return ATrans
Algorithm 2: CountTran(hs, s0i,⇧, P )
1 for every path ⇡ 2 ⇧ do
2 Abstract ⇡ using P to get the abstract path ⇡P ;
3 Let l be the length of ⇡ ;
4 for si 2 ⇡P [2 · · · l] do
5 if ⇡P [i  1] = s then
6 #s = #s + 1;
7 if DP (⇡P [i  1],⇡P [i]) = s0 then
8 #s0 = #s0 + 1;
9 Add the corresponding concrete state of
⇡P [i  1] to  +(s,DP ,⇧);
10 else
11 Add the corresponding concrete state of
⇡P [i  1] to   (s,DP ,⇧);
12 return #s, #hs, s0i,  +(s,DP ,⇧),   (s,DP ,⇧)
the rest. In the following, we first collect these two sets of states
and identify a predicate for separating them using a classification
algorithm.
Given any concrete execution ⇡ = hs1, s2, · · · , sni in ⇧, it is
clear that we can map any state si in the sequence to an abstract
state in DP . Let  (s,DP ,⇧) be the set of concrete states in any
execution in ⇧ which are mapped to state s in DP . We define
 +(s,DP ,⇧) = {x|x 2  (s,DP ,⇧) ^ 9h· · · , x, y, · · · i 2
⇧ ^ y 2  (s0,DP ,⇧)}, i.e., the set of concrete states in s which
do transit to a concrete state in s0 in one of the concrete trace.
We define   (s,DP ,⇧) to be  (s,DP ,⇧)    +(s,DP ,⇧).
Algorithm 2 shows how we collect the positive and negative data
from system traces for a given spurious transition. For every trace
in ⇧, we first abstract ⇡ with P at line 2. Starting from the
second state in ⇡P to the end, we iteratively check whether its
previous state is s at line 5. If it is true, we then check whether
the current state is s0 at line 7. If yes, we add the current state
to  +(s,DP ,⇧) at line 9; otherwise, we add it to   (s,DP ,⇧)
instead. Fig. 7 illustrates how the above works with our running
example. Assume that at the top is a concrete trace and at the
bottom is the corresponding abstract trace. Given that we identified
previously that the spurious transition is h0, 0i, the concrete states
s1, s2 and s3 are collected to the set  +(s,DP ,⇧) and state s4
s1 s2 s3 s4 s5 · · ·
D+ D 
0 0 0 0 1 · · ·X X X 7A
bs
tr
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Fig. 7: Labeled data collection at spurious transition h0, 0i
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Fig. 8: A simple example of SVM with only two variables. The
filled circles are the collected positive states and the empty circles
are collected negative states.
is collected into   (s,DP ,⇧).
Generate a new predicate Once we obtain the labeled data of
the spurious transition, we then adopt a supervised classification
technique to generate a new predicate for refinement. In partic-
ular, we use Support Vector Machine (SVM) [15], [20] as it
is reasonably scalable and produces a classifier in the form of
a predicate. SVM is a supervised machine learning algorithm
for classification and regression analysis. In this work, we use
its binary classification functionality. Mathematically speaking,
the binary classification functionality of (linear) SVM works as
follows. Given the two sets of concrete states  +(s,DP ,⇧) and
  (s,DP ,⇧), SVM generates, if there is any, a linear classifier
(hyperplane) in the form of e =
P
i ci ⇤ xi   c where xi 2 V
is a variable value and ci and c are learned coefficients such that
(1) for every state x 2  +(s,DP ,⇧), [[e]]x = 1 and (2) for every
state x 2   (s,DP ,⇧), [[e]]x = 0. As a simple example, for
a classification task with only two features (variables), a linear
classifier (hyperplane) is a line that linearly separates the two sets
of data while providing a maximum margin between the two sets,
which is shown in Fig. 8.
In our running example, since transition h0, 0i is the most
spurious, we collect the two sets of concrete states in order to
split state 0 in the DTMC shown on the left of Fig. 6. Recall
that a concrete state contains the valuation of 32 variables. We
feed the two sets into SVM to generate a classifier. Notice that a
boolean variable is mapped to 1 if its value is true and 0 otherwise.
The result is a predicate constituted by all 32 variables. To
simplify the predicate, we start from the variable with the largest
coefficient and try to identify a classifier with a minimum number
of variables [20], e.g., a predicate constituted by a minimum
number of variables and yet is able to classify the two sets. The
result is the predicate new < runCount. The predicate is then
9Algorithm 3: LAR(⇧,Pr(F'), ✏max,↵, ,  )
1 let P be the set of atomic propositions in ';
2 while true do
3 construct abstract executions ⇧P based on ⇧ and P ;
4 apply a model learning algorithm (e.g. AALERGIA
with ✏ ranging from 1 to ✏max) to learn a model DP
based on ⇧P ;
5 probabilistic model check DP against ';
6 if DP |= ' then
7 report ' is verified, model DP ;
8 return;
9 construct a probabilistic counterexample C using the
approach in [26];
10 run hypothesis testing on C with error bounds (↵, )
and indifference region  ;
11 if C is not spurious then
12 report ' is violated and the probability of error is
bounded by (↵, );
13 return;
14 identify the most spurious transitions hs, s0i in C;
15 collect  +(s,DP ,⇧) and   (s,DP ,⇧);
16 apply SVM to identify a predicate p separating the
two sets;
17 add p into P ;
added into P , and used to refine the abstraction. The right part of
Fig. 6 shows the learned model after refinement, where the second
bit of the state label captures the value of the new predicate. It
can be observed that a new terminal state 00 is introduced, which
effectively reduces the probability of reaching observe0 > 1.
Remark 3. We remark that  +(s,DP ,⇧) and   (s,DP ,⇧) may
not be linearly separable, in which case linear SVM could not
generate a satisfactory linear classifier (i.e., the obtained clas-
sifier has low classification accuracy). Although SVM could
adopt different kinds of kernels (e.g., polynomial and RBF) to
identify a polynomial or even more expressive classifier, we
prefer linear classifiers as the learned classifier and model are
presented as a part of the verification results and the easier
it is, the easier it is for human understanding. In case a linear
classifier for separating  +(s,DP ,⇧) and   (s,DP ,⇧) does
not exist, we move on to identify a predicate using the same
approach based on the next most spurious transition.
3.5 Overall Algorithm
The overall algorithm is shown as Algorithm 3. The inputs of
the algorithms are a set of concrete executions ⇧, a property
in the form of Pr(F'), and the parameters (↵, ) and   for
hypothesis testing. During each iteration of the loop from line 2
to 17, we start with constructing a set of abstract traces based
on ⇧ and a set of predicates P . Note that we set the initial set
of predicates for abstraction to be the set of propositions in the
property. Next, an abstract DTMC DP is learned using a model
learning algorithm. We then verify DP against the property using
PMC. If the property is verified, we conclude that the system is
verified and present DP as a part of the evidence. Otherwise, we
construct a probabilistic counterexample C (i.e., a set of abstract
paths) at line 9. The spuriousness of C is then checked through
hypothesis testing at line 10. If it passes the test, it is returned as
a counterexample. In addition, we output the bounded probability
of C being a spurious counterexample. Otherwise, at line 14, we
identify the most spurious transition and obtain a new predicate
at line 16. After adding the new predicate into P , we restart the
process from line 2.
In our running example, after adding the new predicate, we
learn the model as shown on the right of Fig. 6. Note that state
0 in the model on the left is split into two states 00 and 01. This
is due to the new predicate. Note also that the spurious transition
h0, 0i is split into two, which effectively reduces the probability of
the counterexample. Verifying this new model against the property
using PMC returns true and thus we successfully verify the system
without requiring a system model as input.
Remark 4. It is hard to analyze the complexity of LAR as it de-
pends on several factors, i.e., the initial set of predicates P , the
complexity of the model learning algorithm, the complexity of
hypothesis testing, the complexity of SVM, and whether there
is a linear classifier, etc. We thus rely on empirical studies to
evaluate the efficiency and effectiveness of the algorithm in
the next section. Note that if SVM fails to find a classifier for
all the spurious transitions, Algorithm 3 terminates and reports
the verification is unsuccessful. Otherwise, it either reports true
with a supporting model or a counterexample.
4 EVALUATION
Our approach has been implemented as a self-contained toolkit
named LAR (available at GitHub [1]) with about 6K lines of Java
code. LAR relies on the LIBSVM library [6], [15] for generating
new predicates and PRISM model checker for PMC [38]. All
models and detailed results discussed below are available at [2].
Experiment settings
We identify and compare our approach with two latest state-of-the-
art approaches developed based on stochastic regular grammatical
inference. One is the AALERGIA algorithm (hereafter AA) [40],
[42]. The other is the GA-based approach (hereafter GA) in [55].
Our test subjects include DTMC models from the PRISM
benchmark suite [36], as well as a real-world water treatment
system (SWaT) [3]. Table 2 summarizes the system configuration
and the property to verify of the test subjects, where the detailed
description of the PRISM benchmark systems can be found at [37].
SWaT [3] is a complicated system which involves a series of
water treatment processes like ultra-filtration, chemical dosing,
dechlorination through an ultraviolet system, etc. We regard SWaT
as a representative of our target complex systems. We conduct our
experiments on a simulator of the SWaT due to safety concerns.
The simulator contains an exact Python translation (about 3K
LOC) of the control software in SWaT and a set of Ordinary
Differential Equations (ODEs) for simulating the environment.
The property we verify is how likely the raw water tank in the
system would go underflow. For each model, a set of system
traces are first obtained through random simulation. For a fair
comparison, we use the same set of system traces to learn from
for all the algorithms. The total length of the traces for all the
systems is set to be 20000. To validate the verification results,
we need to know the actual results (last column of Table 2). For
each benchmark in the PRISM benchmark suite [36], we apply
PRISM on their corresponding PRISM model to obtain the actual
probability. Since we do not have the actual model of SWaT, we
10
TABLE 2: Case studies under evaluation. Column ‘Config’ is the
system configuration; column ‘Property’ is the property to verify;
column ‘#states’ is the state space of the original system; column
‘Pact’ is the actual probability of the property being satisfied.
Case study Config Property #states Pact(parameters)
crowds
(R,S)
5,5
Positive
8k 0.1458
5,10 111k 0.1048
5,15 592k 0.0922
5,20 2062k 0.0861
egl
(L,N)
2,5 Unfair for A 29k 0.5156Unfair for B 0.4844
2,10 Unfair for A 6E5k 0.5005Unfair for B 0.4995
nand
(N,K)
20,2
Reliable
155k 0.4129
20,3 232k 0.4685
60,1 4717k 0.2695
60,3 1.4E5k 0.6377
SWaT
(S,R)
5,1
Underflow
1 0.1713
5,5 1 0.1389
10,5 1 0.3333
TABLE 3: Parameters for each algorithm.
Algorithm Parameter Value
AA ✏max 64
GA
number of chromosome 50
maximum generation 10
mutation rate 0.1
selection probability 0.9
LAR
↵ 0.05
  0.05
  0.05
✏max 64
& 0.8
estimate the verification result based on a large number of traces
(e.g., one week’s simulation). For each model, LAR is set to verify
a property of the form Pr(F'). In our experiment, r is set to be
20% above the actual P(F').
Table 3 shows the details of the parameters we used in our
experiments for AA, GA and LAR respectively. For AA, there
is only one parameter which is the maximum value of ✏ to
choose from2. For GA, there are 4 parameters as follows. We
set the number of chromosomes in each generation to be 50. The
mutation rate for the mutation operator is set to be 0.1. We use
the tournament selection strategy to select the good chromosomes
in each generation and the probability to keep the winner is set
to be 0.9. Finally, the maximum number of generation for the
evolution is set to be 10. For LAR, the parameters are mainly
for hypothesis testing, the maximum value of ✏ for AA, and the
minimum classification accuracy for SVM. In particular, the error
bounds for hypothesis testing are set as ↵ = 0.05,  = 0.05. The
indifference region is set to be   = 0.05. The maximum value
of ✏ to choose from is set to be 64 which is the same as AA.
The minimum required accuracy for SVM classification & is set to
be 0.8. All the experiments were conducted on an OS X machine
with 2.6GHz quad-core Intel Core i7 processor and 8 GB RAM.
We aim to answer the following research questions through our
experiments.
2. Note that the minimum value is 1 as required for convergence
RQ1: Is LAR better in verifying systems than state-of-the-art
approaches based on learning probabilistic models?
The results are summarized in Table 4, where - means no results
after the preset timeout 2 hours. We show the results of applying
AA and GA on the basic abstraction which is defined by whether
a state satisfies the target property or not in column ‘AA Basic’
and ‘GA Basic’ respectively. We can observe that in all cases
the verification results on the learned models are 1 due to overly
coarse abstraction and inappropriate state merging. Column ‘AA’
shows the results of the AALERGIA algorithm and column ‘GA’
shows the results of the GA-based approach. Column ‘LAR’
shows our results. We leave the explanation of column ‘AA-
LAR’ later. Note that for crowds and nand protocol, we have
to do manual abstraction first for AA and GA, i.e., heuristically
select a smallest number of variables which gives us reasonable
results, otherwise neither AA nor GA can learn a model within
the time limit. This means that LAR is competing with AA and
GA combining some manual abstraction. We remark that this is
precisely the advantage of LAR which automatically identifies a
level of abstraction which verifies the property.
It can be observed that LAR successfully verified all systems,
whereas both AA and GA failed on about half the systems. In
most cases especially for the benchmark systems, LAR only takes
few iterations to identify a model which allows us to prove the
property. This is particularly useful in verifying systems with a
large number of (or infinite) states. For instance, for the egl model,
while AA (or GA) fails to learn or verify any of the 4 cases, LAR
successfully verifies all of them in about 5 seconds and the learned
models have 4 states only. The latter two crowds cases show
similar results. This is especially the case for the SWaT system.
Because the variables in this system are all float numbers, without
abstraction, every logged state is different from others and as a
result, there is no generalization (i.e., no state merging in AA and
GA) and no models could be learned. On the other hand, LAR
is able to learn reasonably small models by automatic abstraction
refinement.
Efficiency-wise, Fig. 9 shows the time cost of AA, GA and
LAR for different systems. We can observe that LAR takes much
less time than AA and GA (given the same number of traces).
In over half of the cases neither AA nor GA can learn a model
within the time limit, whereas LAR can learn an accurate model
within minutes. This is largely because a much smaller DTMC is
learned, since the abstract traces only have a few symbols (up
to 2#P where #P is the number of predicates in P ) in the
alphabet. Furthermore, because the learned model is small, model
checking whether the model satisfies the property through PMC
takes much less time. Fig. 10 shows the time distribution of each
step in LAR, which include learning the model (Learning), PMC
on the learned model (PMC), hypothesis testing of counterexample
(Hypothesis testing) and abstraction refinement (Refinement) to
generate a new predicate. A close look reveals that learning, PMC
and spuriousness checking through hypothesis testing dominates
LAR’s time (about 80% on average), while abstraction refinement
takes very little time, i.e., mostly less than 10%. Fig. 11 shows the
time cost of LAR in each iteration. It can be observed that in most
cases the time cost grows slowly by iteration. The only exception
is the last iteration of swat-2. We observe that there is a significant
increase in the number of states in the learned model in the last
iteration, which takes a relatively long time to model check. We
thus have the following answer to RQ1.
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TABLE 4: Verification results on learned models using different learning approaches.
System #Config Pact
AA Basic AA GA Basic GA LAR AA-LAR
#states result #states result #states result #states result iters #states result #states result
crowds
1 0.1458 4 1 10572 1 3 1 102 1 2 6 0.1549 5 0.156
2 0.1048 4 1 10894 1 3 1 158 0.1054 2 6 0.101 5 0.114
3 0.0922 4 1 - - 3 1 206 1 2 6 0.066 5 0.082
4 0.0861 4 1 - - 3 1 266 1 2 6 0.0877 5 0.084
egl
1 0.5156 4 1 - - 3 1 - - 1 34 0.4961 55 0.48340.4844 0.5039 0.5166
2 0.5005 4 1 - - 3 1 - - 1 4 0.4619 107 0.48880.4995 0.5381 0.5112
nand
1 0.4129 4 1 1257 0.4878 3 1 90 0.4999 3 8 0.3844 7 0.3849
2 0.4685 4 1 1793 0.4995 3 1 90 0.4995 3 8 0.5332 7 0.43
3 0.2695 4 1 14987 0.1428 3 1 250 0.1707 2 6 0.1458 5 0.2286
4 0.6377 4 1 - - 3 1 - - 4 11 0.606 9 0.6
SWaT
1 0.1713 101 1 - - 3 1 - - 7 274 0.2 852 0.2
2 0.1389 186 1 - - 2 1 - - 12 930 0.1408 4139 0.189
3 0.3333 255 1 - - 3 1 - - 20 974 0.2268 4226 0.2999
TABLE 5: Experiment results of LAR: given different safety threshold in the property
System #Config Pact
LAR-r2 LAR-r3 LAR-r4
#states iters time result #states iters time result #states iters time result
crowds
1 0.1458 6 2 109 0.1723 6 2 104 0.1599 6 2 96 0.1794
2 0.1048 6 2 119 0.1044 6 2 119 0.1051 6 2 108 0.1051
3 0.0922 6 2 114 0.063 6 2 110 0.0594 6 2 104 0.0561
4 0.0861 6 2 116 0.0845 6 2 115 0.0813 6 2 121 0.0848
egl
1 0.5156 34 1 5 0.4961 34 1 5 0.4961 34 1 5 0.49610.4844 0.5039 0.5039 0.5039
2 0.5005 4 1 6 0.4619 4 1 6 0.4619 4 1 6 0.46190.4844 0.5381 0.5381 0.5381
nand
1 0.4129 8 3 119 0.4532 8 3 95 0.3674 8 3 83 0.349
2 0.4685 8 3 0.6 0.4912 8 3 88 0.5098 8 3 60 0.4997
3 0.2695 6 2 100 0.1276 6 2 80 0.1333 6 2 76 0.1818
4 0.6377 11 4 166 0.381 – – – – – – – –
SWaT
1 0.1713 274 7 48 0.2 204 6 40 0.375 204 6 41 0.375
2 0.1389 693 11 121 0.2289 542 9 84 0.3932 532 7 56 0.4226
3 0.3333 910 17 719 0.4475 910 17 738 0.4475 910 17 723 0.4475
Answer to RQ1: LAR is more effective and efficient in verify-
ing complex systems than state-of-the-art approaches based
on learning probabilistic models by automatically identifying
a right level of abstraction for learning.
RQ2: Is LAR able to learn models better than those learned
by state-of-the-art approaches?
Recall that if LAR reports that the property is verified, a model is
returned. It is thus important that the learned models are of high-
quality. In the following, we evaluate the quality of the learned
models in three aspects.
First of all, it can be observed from Table 4 that the models
generated by LAR have much fewer states than AA or GA, i.e.,
often order of magnitudes fewer than the model learned by AA.
The reason is that we always start with learning based on the
coarsest abstraction and only add one predicate for abstraction if
necessary. We remark that learning small models is important if
the models are to be reviewed by experts or used to implement
runtime monitors as they are easier to interpret. For instance,
for the example crowds protocol, the learned new predicate is
new < runCount, where runCount is a variable representing
how many runs are left and new represents whether it is about to
start a new run. Intuitively, this predicate allows us to separate
the last run from the other runs, which is relevant because if
observer0 is 0 after the second last run, it is impossible to reach
a state satisfying observe0 > 1. With the learned predicate, we
can easily interpret the learned system models and implement a
runtime monitor monitoring how the system evolves afterwards.
Secondly, to evaluate the accuracy of the learned models, we apply
PMC on the model learned by LAR to compute the probability
P(F') (although LAR’s verification results are either true or
false). It can be observed that the models produced by LAR
often (i.e., in 14 out of 15 cases) have more or equally precise
verification results than those models learned by both AA and GA.
Lastly, we measure how accurate LAR’s models are, compared to
‘best’ model which can be learned at the learned abstract level. To
do that we generate a large number of traces (5 times more than
those used in LAR), abstract them with the same set of predicates
learned by LAR, and apply AA to learn a model. Given that AA is
guaranteed to converge [40], [42], we assume these models to be
the accurate models at this abstract level. We then compare them
with LAR’s models. Column ‘AA-LAR’ shows details related to
these accurate models learned by AA, i.e., the number of states
and the result of P(F') based on the models. It can be observed
that the models learned by LAR are rather close to these best
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Fig. 9: Learning time of AA, GA and LAR in seconds. The preset
timeout is 7200 s.
models. It thus suggests that not only LAR has found an abstract
level to prove the property but also it is able to learn accurate
models at the chosen abstract level. We thus have the following
answer to RQ2.
Answer to RQ2: LAR is able to learn more accurate and
much smaller models (at the identified abstraction level) than
state-of-the-art approaches.
RQ3: Is LAR able to learn models in a property-guided way?
Recall that LAR aims to learn a model which is sufficiently
accurate to show that the probability of reaching certain states
is less than r. Thus, with a larger r, ideally a coarser model which
is easier to comprehend will be learned. In the above experiments,
we fix r to be 20% more than the actual probability. In the
following, we perform additional experiments to show the effect
of having different r values. That is, we run r which are 40%, 80%
and 100% above the actual probability (for SWaT configuration 1
and 2, we run r which are 2/3/4 times of the actual probability
since Pact is a small value). The results are shown in Table 5 (–
means no results because the threshold is larger than 1.).
It can be observed that for benchmark systems, similarly or
identical models are learned by LAR for different r-values. The
reason is that for these relatively small systems, it is easy to learn
a model which produces accurate verification results after few
iterations. In contrast, for the SWaT system, LAR learns a coarser
model with fewer states, and less accurate result (which is still
good enough to prove the property). We thus have the following
answer to RQ3.
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Fig. 10: The time distribution of LAR in each step including
learning, PMC, hypothesis testing and refinement.
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Answer to RQ3: LAR is able to learn models at different
abstraction levels in a property-guided way.
Threats to validity The above experiments successfully show the
effectiveness and efficiency of LAR over the test subjects. In the
following, we discuss several threats to the validity. First of all,
it can be observed that a strict property (with probability close to
the actual probability) requires learning a detailed model, whereas
a loose property requires a coarse model. In the worse case, if
the property can only be verified with all details in the system,
then we must refine all the way until every detail is included.
One question is then how we know whether the property is strict
or not so as to tell whether LAR will be effective. In general,
there is no good solution. Secondly, there is a tradeoff between the
complexity of the classification algorithm to generate the predicate
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and the interpretability of the learned model. For example, if the
dataset is not linear separable and we apply kernel functions for
SVM, the generated predicate will not be easy to interpret. For
real-world complex systems, it might be possible that a linear
classifier does not exist, in which case we will either fail to learn
a model (without adopting kernels for SVM) or learn a model
that is not intuitive for understanding (adopting kernels for SVM).
Thirdly, LAR refines the abstraction by choosing a particular
spurious transition and separate the concrete states there. Thus,
the selection of different spurious transitions may lead to different
ways of refinement and thus models of different quality. Lastly,
LAR uses statistical hypothesis testing to check the spuriousness
of a counterexample in every iteration. An alternative way is to
apply SMC to check the given property directly, learn a model
from the traces captured during SMC if the property is violated
and explain to the user how the system fails. It is in general hard
to predict which approach is more efficient because it depends
on the specific property and system. For instance, in case the
property is indeed violated by the system, the alternative approach
might be more efficient in triggering such violations. However, the
improvement depends on the difference between the probability
threshold in the property and the actual probability of property
violation. The larger the difference, the more significant is the
improvement. In reality, CPS are usually equipped with safety
mechanisms to avoid safety violations, which means that the
probability of the actual safety violation is usually low. In case
the property is satisfied, the comparison boils down to comparing
the efficiency of spuriousness checking and the efficiency of
SMC, which is also hard to tell. According to our experiments,
a spurious counterexample can usually be checked quickly using
SPRT during each iteration due to the wrong abstraction. On the
other hand, SMC for a property with low probability may take a
long time. In the future, we will evaluate them in a separate work.
5 RELATED WORK
This work takes a further step towards the emerging trend to
leverage system data for formal verification. It extends the recent
line of work to ‘learn’ (probabilistic especially) models (e.g., in
the form of DTMC, CTMC, stationary models and MDPs) from
system data for model checking [16], [40], [41], [42], [49] in
order to avoid manual modeling. Existing learning algorithms are
often based on algorithms designed for learning (probabilistic)
automata, as evidenced in [7], [13], [14], [21], [47], [48]. In [12],
reinforcement learning algorithms are adopted to verify Markov
decision processes, without constructing explicit models. LAR
complements these model learning approaches with a CEGAR-
style framework so that model learning can be done in a more
guided way, i.e., learn at the proper level of abstraction towards
the verification of certain properties. On the other hand, rather
than learning a single model from system data, the authors of [4],
[24] proposes a Bayesian inference approach which performs
verification over the entire property- and model-based feasible
class of models while providing a confidence over the data-
generating system.
This work is also closely related to the following line of
work which aims to quantitatively verify stochastic hybrid systems
with confidence. In [5], [22], [25], [52], the authors uses formal
abstraction to quantitatively approximate the system with an
abstract computable model. The approximation is parameterized,
which then allows to quantify the distance between the models as
well as their solution processes [59]. Furthermore, a CEGAR-
style procedure is proposed to refine the abstraction when the
approximate model is not satisfactory [53].
SMC [19], [46], [50], [56], [57] is another line of work for
quantitative verification that can be applied when the system
model is not available. Hypothesis testing is initially adopted
by SMC mainly for bounded properties. There is some recent
work on extending SMC to unbounded properties [46], [56], and
combining learning and abstraction for faster SMC [43]. The main
difference between LAR and SMC is that LAR generates models
as a part of the verification results, which would offer knowledge
or insight on how the system works and why the property is
verified. Furthermore, because LAR verifies the system based on
the learned model, it is not limited to bounded properties.
The main idea of this work is inspired by CEGAR [17], [18],
[29], [30], [35] and in particular its extension to probabilistic
systems. The fundamental questions and pragmatic issues of
probabilistic abstraction refinement are first explored in [31] in the
context of predicate abstraction [23], [54], where a probabilistic
counterexample (obtained using the approach documented in [26])
is analyzed to refine an abstraction. Compared to CEGAR and
probabilistic CEGAR, LAR is different as LAR does not require
any user-provided system models, which yields a completely
automatic verification framework from system data.
6 CONCLUSION
In this work, we propose a framework to automatically verify
discrete-time complex systems without manual modeling through
a combination of learning, abstraction and refinement. Our eval-
uation shows that LAR not only is more effective and efficient
in verifying systems than state-of-the-art learning approaches by
automatically identifying a level of abstraction in a property-
guided way, but also generates models of high quality which could
be useful for subsequent system analysis purposes like runtime
monitoring or model-based testing. Our main contribution lies in
proposing such an automatic verification framework from system
data, a systematic way to analyze spurious counterexamples for
refinement, and adopt SVM to generate new predicates from
system data directly without the assumption of having the original
system model. In the future, we plan to compare our approach
with statistical model checking by conducting a more systematic
empirical study and extend the work to Markov Decision Process
to support modeling and verification of a richer range of systems.
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APPENDIX A
BOUND ON THE LEARNING ERROR
Let A = (aij)1i,jm be a stochastic matrix of size m ⇥ m,
which represents the actual transition matrix of M and Aˆ =
(aˆij)1i,jm be that of DP . For simplicity, we assume Aˆ is
learned through a simple algorithm based on Monte Carlo fre-
quency estimate. That is, aˆij = nij/ni where ni is the number of
times a transition has been taken from state i and nij the number
of times that transition from state i to state j has been taken. We
denote n0 = min1im ni.
Given a precision bound ✏ and a confidence bound  , we show
that it is feasible to determine a sampling scheme that guarantees
after a minimal number of samples:
P (||Aˆ A|| > ✏) <   (4)
where ||Aˆ A|| denotes a matrix distance between Aˆ and A.
In what follows, let the distance be defined as ||Aˆ   A|| =
supij |aˆij   aij |.
P (||Aˆ A|| > ✏) = P (sup
ij
|aˆij   aij | > ✏)
= P
0@[
ij
{|aˆij   aij | > ✏}
1A

X
ij
P (|aˆij   aij | > ✏)

X
ij
P (|nij
ni
  aij | > ✏)

X
ij
2 exp( 2ni✏2) (Okamoto bound)
 2m2 exp( 2n0✏2)
Based on the above, given   and ✏, ⇧ must contain enough
traces such that each state is visited at least n0 = d 12✏2 log
 
 
2m2
 e
if we are to guarantee that the learned model satisfies the constraint
stated in Equation 4.
This bound is conservative. However, this sampling scheme
terminates with probability 1 since all the states are reachable.
Furthermore, there are several ways to improve this bound. First,
the term m2 could be replaced by the number of transitions K
such that aij is different from 0 or 1. In that case, P (|aˆij  
aij | > ✏) is necessarily equal to 0, then sequential frequentist
methods based on sharper bounds may be used (e.g. [32]) instead
of the used Okamoto bound. Besides, the number of samples is
also impacted by the choice of ✏. Finally, the choice of the matrix
distance is also important. For example, at the learning level, we
could prefer a distance that takes into account probabilities pi of
being in state i in order to guarantee a fine per-transition error
bound over states that are often visited and a coarser bound over
states that are not often visited. This is left to future work.
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